Engineering Ethics & Professionalism

Engineers change society through the artefacts they create and the processes they use to create them. What responsibility do engineers have for these changes? Can we lay down hard and fast rules for engineering behaviour? Should we try?

Even where the methodology employed in problem solving exercises is "scientific" and essentially "value-free", neither the selection of the problem to be solved nor the criteria for their solution are in fact value free. Both are heavily weighted by cultural and economic factors within our society. In this process, questions of importance to the engineering profession are often ignored, issues such as who chooses the problems or selects the projects. What groups or individuals decide on building a motorway rather than a light rail system? Who sets the criteria for a new dam or a word processor? What input is there from the people that are most affected by the changes? Do the engineers involved have a say? Do they expect to?

1. Ethics & Social Responsibility

 The debate about whether technical professionals have a responsibility for the outcomes of their work has been going on for centuries. When the Royal Society was formed in 1663, its curator of experiments, Robert Hooke (1635-1703), reminded the members that their business was: "to improve the knowledge of natural things, not meddling with Divinity, Metaphysics, Moralls, Politicks, Grammar, Rhetorick or Logic". 

However, by the eighteenth century, there was a widespread expectation that the new sciences and technologies would be instruments for carrying out a comprehensive transformation of society. Science has liberated the ideas of those that read and reflected. Science was essentially progressive (Leo Marx 1987). Another shift occurred around the middle of the nineteenth century. Since then, the explicit association of science with broad goals of social and political advancement has weakened. However, the continuing emphasis of the central importance of science and technology has lead to a very narrow technocratic view of progress. This approach assumes that a society only needs to ensure the advance of science-based technologies, and the rest will take care of itself. The rate of technological innovation is treated as the essential criterion of social progress. 

Some scientists today would still feel inclined to agree with Hooke's sentiments: it is as though they were living in the seventeenth century – before the Industrial Revolution, mass communication, the atom bomb and space travel provided ample evidence that quite dramatic "meddling" is the outcome of the work they do. Indeed, the simple urge "to improve the knowledge of natural things" was itself part of the process that changed the world. But responsible engineers cannot now sit back and claim that they are detached from other human concerns such as ethics and politics. Awareness of the implicit values is important for socially responsible engineering practice. To be good engineers, men and women need to first be good citizens, to know how their society functions and be actively involved.  

Hooke's prescription for natural philosophy in the seventeenth century is not relevant to engineering in the twenty-first century – the role of engineers is, and always has been, to "meddle". Our meddling must be beneficial, not harmful. In order to sustain and enhance the quality of life on this planet and ultimately beyond it, we need to understand the context in which we meddle. First we must recognise what is happening and the implications of our activities. We can then go on to consider how to minimise any negative consequences and maximise the benefits of our work. 

What is "Ethics"? 

It is useful to differentiate between morals, which centres on rules of right conduct for individual, and ethics, which centres on systems of moral principles and rules of conduct for the behaviour of groups, in our case the group defined as engineering professionals. Flew (1984) notes that, to a lay person, ethics suggests: "…a set of standards by which a particular group decides to regulate its behaviour – to distinguish between what is legitimate or acceptable in pursuit of their aims and what is not." Flew's definition is not specifically concerned with whether the agreed behaviour is "right" or "wrong". Based on this specification we could suggest a spectrum of "codes of behaviour" with an increasing degree of concern to ensure moral and socially responsible and responsive behaviour. The spectrum could run from a "code of etiquette", through a "code of conduct" to a "code of ethics". The first of these terms carries an implication that it is social proprieties, rather than a concern for justice or moral excellence, which drives the behaviour. The second and third of these terms are generally used interchangeably and carry an implication of moral concern. 

In philosophical terms, ethics is: "an investigation into the fundamental principles and concepts that are or ought to be found in a given field of human thought or activity. Being a branch of philosophy it is a theoretical study. As such it differs from "ethics" in the lay sense outlined above, in that any actual body of ethical belief … will be intended to be a practical guide to living and not merely an exposition and analysis of certain theoretical doctrines." (Flew, p. 112.) 

Normative ethics is the investigation of how individuals and organisations ought to behave where moral considerations are involved. We can distinguish between normative ethics and conceptual or descriptive inquires about the logical form of morality. This involves the question of the objectivity or subjectivity of moral judgements. Conceptual and descriptive approaches, also known as meta-ethics, are relevant to deciding the sorts of arguments which can appropriately be used to support or refute any given belief.  

Ethics is that branch of philosophy that is concerned with what is morally right or wrong, but there are wide differences in the approaches different philosophical schools take to ethics. For example, from the perspective of linguistic analysis, ethics is concerned with analysing moral concepts and arguments, which some of its adherents see as merely scientifically unverifiable expressions of approval or disapproval. In contrast, existentialism has given rise to situation ethics, which is openly subjective and asserts that there are no absolute rights or wrongs. The focus is on the individual who has a moral problem or choice, and important factors are authenticity, autonomy and deciding to act, rather than allowing the situation to control the individual. 

Being concerned with the application of ethics rather than its theory, we will concentrate on normative ethics, defined as: "sets of standards by which to distinguish what is legitimate or acceptable in pursuit of our aims and what is not; rules of conduct which are necessary for, or at least an aid to, the purposes of a profession." 

Ethics and a Technological Ethos 

Albert Schweitzer once wrote, "The great fault of all ethics hitherto has been that they believed themselves to have to deal only with the relation of man to man". This was, indeed, an enormous mistake. It could only be sustained by a belief that science, technology and human relationships with the physical world are ethically neutral and also that we as individuals have no moral obligations as far as the natural world is concerned. 

Nor can it be assumed that technology itself is ethically neutral, and that it is only the uses to which technology is put which raise ethical issues. We explicitly reject this view. Choices have to be made as to which technologies are developed and which are not. Because technology embodies the values and aspirations of its creators, it cannot itself be ethically neutral. Technology is essentially ambiguous, with both positive and negative features. Only by addressing its problems and seizing its opportunities do we make technology answerable to ethical questions. 

Within the work situation, there are important issues to the way technology is applied to job design which illustrate the ambiguity of technology and which professional engineers need to consider. How might ethics relate to our responsibilities in the design of production jobs? Is designing satisfying jobs an imperative? Rosenbrock (1990) argues that our dominant model of production (and ultimately of people) is still a "machine" model. The machine operates on the basis of cause and effect. It is designed to meet a purpose, but does not itself have a purpose, particularly a human purpose. This "machine" approach is consistent with, indeed justifies, factory workers being treated simply as robots, to be programmed, and replaced as soon as suitable machines have been developed which can perform their particular functions. The jobs have no intrinsic worth or motivation – the only motivation is the wage. Widespread absence of intrinsic satisfaction in production work and a narrow focus on wages outcomes may well in turn shape very narrow and limiting social attitudes to work. 

Rosenbrock proposes an alternative way of thinking about these issues, based on consideration of specifically human purposes. He suggests that we can be: "distinguished from the machines by what joins us to the other animals: by the fact that our purposes, with the actions which result from them, are subordinate to the purpose of flesh and blood. We should see ourselves as distinguished from the rest of the animal world by what unites us to machines: the fact that we can implement complicated logical sequences of cause and effect which represent the policy needed to fulfil a purpose. We should see ourselves as distinguished from both, and unique, by our capacity to implement purposes which span these two kinds of activity." (Rosenbrock 1990, pp. 162-3) 

Sustained and deliberate aesthetic and creative activities, such as art, craft and design, including engineering design, are thus characterised by Rosenbrock as specifically human. This is consistent with our awareness that these activities resist formalisation and reduction to routine. Rosenbrock advocates the development of a quite different type of technology, in which machines serve people, rather than vice versa. It could be described as "human-centred" technology. Computer-based technologies can be design to support and enhance human skills, rather than to steal them away. Machines which are subordinate to people, rather than machines which control people? A reversal of long-term policies aimed at subdividing and deskilling work? 

These challenging concepts do seem to make sense in the new manufacturing environment, with its premium on flexibility and quick response. While the new technologies may well have been intended to reduce the need for operator skill, Rosenbrock argues that the opposite has turned out to be the case. The new computer-aided techniques appear to make a human-centred approach economically feasible. Indeed, getting the full benefits from applying programmable technologies to manufacturing may require the human-centred approach. 

The introduction of human-centred technologies and work organisation is by no means inevitable. They would have to be introduced into the working environment where the machine rules. Despite the great possibilities for improving work and productivity, major changes in management styles are needed for them to succeed. 

Individuals and Ethical Choices 

Consider the ethical considerations in a more obviously ambiguous technological area, the development, construction and deployment of nuclear weapons. There is a widely held view that the technological systems are autonomous, with a momentum of their own. One stated aim of nuclear weapons systems has been to develop the ability to inflict such terrible damage on an opponent that war would become unthinkable. However, there is a possibility that such systems might actually become dangerously unstable and wipe out most of the world's population. Might we then consider whether or not such systems are intrinsically evil? This involves thinking about the character of choices involved, and forming an ethical view on them. 

We have already indicated that engineers are constantly called upon to make value judgements like those just discussed. The question for ethics is "how should these judgements be made?" This is the central question for both individual members of the profession and for organisations within it. To retain their personal integrity, individuals need to be able to make judgements which reflect their own moral values, as well as the ethical values they share with other members of the profession. As a result of religious or other beliefs, some will wish to recognise a higher authority, higher even than the law of the land. This authority must obviously govern the ethical decision-making process for that person as a professional practitioner, as well as in his or her private life. At the other pole might be the person who merely wishes to know the "rules of the game". Such a person may well find that any reasonable code of conduct gives sufficient guidance. 

The first choice in ethical decision making is therefore that of the level of engagement. Some possible level, which may be seen as making up a hierarchy (no doubt with differences of opinion about the order), are: 

• authority of religious or other beliefs (these are potentially absolute).
• follow the example of a "great leader" (Gandhi, Mao).
• follow the law of the land.
• abide by the code of ethics of a professional body.
• abide by recognised customs and ideals.
• follow the golden rule i.e., do unto others as you would have them do unto you.
• follow your conscience (this may or may not be highly developed).
• make situational decisions (for this you need to be ethically "smart").
• none of these (for this option you need to move fast and keep moving!).

Everyone has some such choices to make. Martin (1981) suggests that one important element in the education of a professional person should be the development of moral autonomy in arriving at reasoned moral views. Each individual needs to be encouraged to work towards formulating his or her own views clearly and explicitly, both for the intrinsic value of this activity and because unless individuals are moral beings they are unlikely to take ethical issues seriously and personally. 

Many of the approaches listed above can provide straightforward and useful guidelines for making simple, clear-cut, ethical decisions. However, "no man is an island" and many decisions are not that simple. Multi-attribute decisions involving a number of parties commonly involve choices between shades of grey. This can move into the sphere of politics. Many of our most intractable social and environmental dilemmas fall into this category. In such circumstances, the professional should not have to rely solely on his or her personal moral code, but should be able to seek guidance from the profession's code of ethics. 

Codes of Ethics 

Ethical expectations for engineering, as for other professions, will depend on the culture of the society and the organisation. Given the business culture of the 1980's, problems were inevitable in the wider community. This culture celebrated individualism at the expense of procedure. It valued conspicuous consumption rather than sound investment. It could not (or at least did not bother to) distinguish between productive enterprises and vulgar nationalism or greed. Only money counted. The responsibility for the excesses of that period goes far beyond the small minority of company directors who have been blamed. 

What role can codes of ethics (sometimes referred to as codes of conduct), play in changing behaviour in work organisations? Codes are only useful in sound organisations. If organisations are moribund, they must be reformed before codes can make a contribution. The prime purpose of codes is in providing guidance and helping to make people aware of the ethical content of their work in, for example, providing routine but important services to the public. Codes can raise consciousness, but they are most effective if they are developed from the bottom up and the process of their development shapes the culture of the organisation. 

Codes of conduct are essentially irrelevant unless ethics is a part of life, a daily way of working. The foundation of ethics is in personal relations. Senior management has a central responsibility to demonstrate a clear commitment to ethical behaviour, for example, in its conduct of everyday office politics. If the organisational culture condones subtle (or not so subtle) abuses of people or proper procedures, then sermons on corruption, misconduct and conflicts of interest will be received cynically. 

Martin and Schinzinger (1989, pp. 86-91) agree that codes of ethics can help to stimulate ethical behaviour and give helpful guidance and advice on moral obligations. As we discuss in more detail below, the codes of ethics of the professions are intended to ensure that the control they exercise is in the interests of the community. Because of their brevity, codes are very general. This breadth and generality has the advantage off offering assistance to the engineer in determining professional conduct in a very wide range of situations. However, to be of much practical value, codes need to be supplemented by guidelines and examples off interpretations. Codes can give moral, and to some extent, legal support to professionals striving to act ethically. To date, they have generally stopped short of providing practical guidance or assistance for "whistleblowers" – professionals trying to expose or prevent unethical behaviour. This assistance seems likely to be increasingly important because of the tendency to attack the messenger rather than the problem.  

Codes of ethics provide a formal basis for the investigation of potentially unethical conduct. However, as suggested above, the mere existence of a code does not necessarily change behaviour. Codes do present a positive image of the profession which, if warranted, can help professionals serve the community more effectively. However, if they are seen as "window-dressing", they merely increase the sort of cynicism about the professions which Illich et al (1977) expressed. Codes cannot be the final moral authority for professional conduct, or a substitute for personal moral responsibility. This is partly because codes change and develop as the community changes. It is also because it is easy for conflicting responsibilities to arise from different tenets of a code. 

A Hippocratic Oath for Engineers? 

In about 400 BC Hypocrites gathered together all that was sound in the previous history of medicine. His is credited with having formulated the "Hippocratic oath", a version of which is still taken by medical practitioners as they complete their training. The oath summarises the ethical code for the practice of medicine. 

In 1970, Thring took up the issue of the morality of engineering work. He posed a "moral scale of machines", from devices for increasing human possibilities for self-fulfilment, through elimination of drudgery and provision of luxury consumer items, to machines with directly harmful purposes such as killing or torturing. He suggested a "Hippocratic oath" for engineers, analogous to that for medical practitioners. (Thring 1970, p. 351.) 

"I vow to strive to apply my professional skills only to projects which, after conscientious examination, I believe to contribute to the goal of co-existence of all human beings in peace, human dignity and self-fulfilment. 

"I believe that this goal requires the provision of an adequate supply of the necessities of life (good food, air, water, clothing and housing, access to normal and man-made beauty), education and opportunities to enable each person to work out for him (or her) self his (or her) life objectives and to develop creativeness and skill in the use of the hands as well as the head. 

"I vow to struggle through my work to minimise danger, noise, strain or invasion of privacy of the individual: pollution of earth, air or water, destruction of natural beauty, mineral resources and wildlife." 

It is striking how much more this oath asks of engineers than the existing codes of ethics do. It could be especially difficult for employees because it assumes a great deal of autonomy and dignity for the individual practitioners. It affirms that employees are not just cogs in a large and impersonal machine, but individuals who can have an impact on the world. 

What can individuals do in the short term? Thring suggested three ways to apply what he saw as the dictates of conscience. First, choose jobs higher up the moral scale. Second, struggle to make the technology you work on safer and more environmentally sustainable. Third, take very opportunity to rectify the uses to which engineering is being put – move the profession towards more ethical, sustainable and equitable practice. Thring suggested that unless technical professionals do change their practices in the directions he proposes, the machines we make will be used to destroy us all. 

Perhaps the major weakness of Thring's proposed oath is that it side-steps the fact that there are many rather unpalatable and potentially destructive aspects of technology which are politically and economically important. A more complete treatment needs to address these squarely. Questions of ensuring national security, for example, need hard-headed decision-making. We must also address the issues of equity more effectively, before many of these technologies can be dispensed with. In the meantime, they do need to be functional and cost-effective. In this context, the allocation of resources between competing national priorities raises ethical issues. 

Winner went on to suggest that ethics courses need to explore the moral purposes and strength of vocation of the potential engineer: "… as a person contemplates committing several decades to a profession, some basic issues ought to be addressed. What are the fundamental ends of a life invested in this kind of work? What is the purpose of developing my knowledge and skill in this direction in the first place?" 

Addressing issues like these is an essential part of laying a solid moral and political foundation for professional life. Winner suggested that two crucial skills needed to be cultivated: political savvy and the capacity for political imagination. With them, students would be prepared for going beyond the question of "how". They would be able to address the moral and ethical question of "why", to proceed beyond sterile discussion about instrumentality and efficiency and take up living concerns about human ends. Professionals are needed who are prepared to dream of a better world and invent technologies which enhance the opportunities for equity and democratic control. The vision of engineering lls needed to be cultivated: political savvy and the capacity for political imagination. With them, students would be prepared for going beyond the question of "how". They would be able to address the moral and ethical question of "why", to proceed beyond sterile discussion about instrumentality and efficiency and take up living concerns about human ends. Professionals are needed who are prepared to dream of a better world and invent technologies which enhance the opportunities for equity and democratic control. The vision of engineering quoted in the previous chapter captures some of this practical altruism. Winner argued that it was this deeper consideration of technological purpose, this concern for the welfare of all in the society, that raised the real challenge for engineering ethics, rather than "melodramatic rehearsals for whistle blowing". Whistle blowing may sometimes become necessary, but it needs to be recognised as a last and extreme resort, in cases where earlier and more positive efforts to improve the situation have failed. 

Codes of ethics have been seen as stifling dissent within a profession. Earlier this century, codes (both local and overseas) placed more emphasis on refraining from criticism of other professionals and upholding the reputation of the profession. This issue is important because complexities and uncertainties are inherent in engineering activity. To avoid repeating failures we need to analyse them openly and come to a detailed and comprehensive understanding of them.

2. Professional Conduct

Broad concerns about the social roles of the professions were raised by Illich et al (1977). They were concerned that professionals had the power to define the problems as well as to implement the solutions, and that these definitions could be detrimental to both client and society. How does professional ethics work in practice?

Ethics and the Role of the Expert

It is important for the long term stability of a "democracy" that the groups or communities affected by decisions are involved in the formulation of the problems to be addressed. How can they have an effective input? In these processes, how are their views balanced against "expert" opinion? To what extent are experts detached from the problems on which they advise, and thus in a position to make "value-free" judgements? Should we see each expert as an advocate for a particular position?

As long as what we do affects different groups of people differently, politics are involved. The definition of the problem to be solved is a key first step in the process of designing the solution. How far should engineers be involved in his? The placing off bounds on what are to be considered to be acceptable solutions also involves political decisions. To work effectively as professionals we need to be sensitive to these issues.

Experts and expert witnesses. The role of the expert witness in a court of law raises important issues. Court cases in Britain are normally run on an adversarial basis, as a contest between two sides. However, despite the fact of being retained (and paid) by one side or the other, the expert is supposed to be impartial. The expert's role is that of an officer of the court, with a responsibility for ensuring that judgement is based on a full understanding by the court of the facts and their implications.

This is a special case of a general problem. We are accustomed to hearing from experts on the whole range of public policy matters. Traditionally, they are supposed to be neutral, without personal or vested interest in the matters on which they speak, to provide objective advice on the basis of which others can formulate policy. How realistic is the concept of their role? What if experts disagree? Does it mean one (or even both) are biased? To answer these questions we need to look at how experts actually work. Part of their role is to collect data, "facts", and then to interpret them. Facts do not choose themselves. The selection of the relevant facts is part of the experts' job. They must not destroy inconvenient data, or invent data to suit their needs, but they do have to make judgements on what is of central importance and on what can safely and legitimately be neglected.

What is Objectivity? Questions as to what constitutes objectivity and how it is to be achieved are not easy to answer. Part of the problem is that the experts we hear from may be committed to positions in the debate. If much off their working lives has been devoted to mastering and advancing a speciality, some degree of commitment to a particular position on many of the issues involved is almost inevitable. In this case the expert is already a party to the debate, and must be expected to act as an advocate, not as a neutral outsider. This does not mean that the expert will act unprofessionally, but it does mean that experts with alternative approaches are needed to put other positions in the argument.

Objectivity means more than simply working through an argument systematically. The very first requirement is that the right questions are asked, so that the debate is broad enough for all the relevant issues to be properly canvassed. The actual problem to be addressed must be well defined before it can be debated effectively. Otherwise the debate inevitably remains unfocused and inconclusive. A problem with technical controversies is that they are often unstructured, and so the adversaries almost never confront one another. If we could bring some order to them, the value of these controversies would be greatly enhanced.

Unfairness in the debate is probably inevitable if there are: massively unequal funding for the opposing sides; domination of research by a few experts; career penalties for unwelcome advice or outcome; and administrative procedures which impose secrecy or otherwise severely limits the debate.

These are public, identifiable, overt sources of bias, which can and should be remedied by public methods. Environmental conflicts need to be handled this way. The proper function of a controversy is actually the identification and evaluation off potential problems. The nature of what is essentially a political debate is that consensus is unlikely; however a decision may still need to be taken. The best decision is then one which can be change if and when a consensus is reached that it was wrong. It is also necessary to preserve the ability to detect an error in the decision and to correct it if necessary. This may involve a cost, but good decision making is not free. The cost of persevering with a bad decision is liable to be orders of magnitude higher (Collingridge 1980).

The essence of good decision making under uncertainty is to keep the options open. A classic example is in the development of a new residential estate. While it may be clear that some mass transit routes will be needed, the best form of vehicle may not be obvious. As long as a suitable corridor is reserved, the costs of setting up whichever system is eventually chosen will be manageable, and the disruption to the community minimised.

Credibility and Trust

An important aspect of expert advice is the extent to which the community is prepared to rely on it. In the absence o trust, decision must be imposed by coercion and the proliferation of rules. This is an area which will be seen as increasingly important in both more and less economically developed countries. While technology assessment is very important for developing countries, there is rarely a substantial group of people with both the opportunity and the expertise to carry it out, particularly in advance to commitment to its implementation.

The public credibility of decision making on technological issues was discussed by Bella et al (1988a and b), in the context of the selection process for a site for a proposed nuclear waste repository. They argued that most of the institutions of power in the USA are now technocratic (i.e., insulated from the political process), and that a new approach to the question off appropriate checks and balances is needed to maintain citizen control off them. They suggested that the professionals charged with the responsibility for making the decisions tended to have what they described as a technocratic perception of the issues, regarding opposition as the result of "activists" alarming a "misinformed public". Hanley (1980) described this as the "Trust me, I know best" posture. The usual meaning of technocracy is:… people who occupy senior positions in various technical fields, as engineering, science, economics, etc., considered as a class exercising a strong influence over society as a whole."

Nelkin (1975) pointed out that technologies of speed and power – airports, power generation, highways and dams – tended to become the focus of opposition. This was partly because, in the process of rational planning, problems were defined as technical rather than political. What was essentially a political choice was then buried in a polarised debate between experts. Different evaluation criteria were used by the proponents and the opponents. Provided each side could muster credible experts, they neutralised each other, and the argument was back here it really belonged, in the political arena. She noted that the clients used expertise in a biased way – its value to them depended more on its utility to them than its scientific merit.

In practice the problems are increasingly complex, and a systems approach is now essential to understanding technical change. The world is a complex dynamic social, political, economic and environmental system, in which technologies act as both positive and negative amplifiers, changing system behaviour. Because of this, new technologies cannot be effectively assessed in isolation, but must be reviewed in terms of their effects on the various system inputs and outputs.

A credible Review Process. Bella et al (1988a and b) argued the need for a democratic perception of the issues, which emphasised real consultation with citizens potentially affected by the decisions, in a process not dominated by the institution involved in the implementation. Their analysis seems widely relevant to both developing and developed countries. Their proposed approach involved open and free review of assumptions and evidence, and free exchange of information with an independent community. It was aimed at addressing the problem of obliging each side to address the issues raised by the other rather than talking past them or ignoring their concerns in the ways described by Martin (1982). The professional engineers code of ethics encourage change in this direction, although at present in developing countries this seems more an ideal model to strive for, rather than a realistic approach.

 We have suggested that the adoption of a code of ethics is one characteristic of a profession. We will now explore the professions and the characteristics of professionals in more detail.

3. What is a Professional?

The term "professional" has its origins in the Latin verb profiteri, to declare aloud or profess a vocation or special calling; it related to the vow made on entering a religious order. Today it is commonly used in two different senses. It is contrasted with "amateur", to indicate someone who is paid for an activity and typically does it full-time. "Professional" is also used to indicate thoroughness and competence. Although modern usage stresses the role of learning and expertise, it is important to recognise the Latin origins of the term; a strong ethical dimension is still an essential aspect of professionalism.

Professions and professionalism are central features of modern social organisation. They provide an important way of managing specialisation within society, although they are not the only way, or even necessarily the best (Johnson 1972). The title "professional" is a claim off social standing and recognition, based on occupational identity. This elite status is seen as essential to recruiting, retaining and motivating quality practitioners. Professions seek autonomy to regulate the activities carried out by their members. Associated with the special status implied by this autonomy is a formal recognition by a profession of its members' responsibilities to society, commonly defined in a code of ethics. Membership of a professional body entails a sharing in the corporate life of the practitioners. Information and experience are shared and a moral "esprit" established. The pervading atmosphere in any healthy profession might perhaps be linked to that of an enlarged family group.

There is a great diversity of opinion as to precisely which occupations are professions. Part of the problem arises from the fact of major changes to even the most traditional "professional" occupations. The understanding of what constitutes a profession also changed. Whilst not helping to achieve a clear definition, in 1933 Carr-Saunders and Wilson summarised the difficulty: "There is no more agreement about the boundary of professionalism than there is about its value … There are certain vocations of ancient lineage which by common consent are called professions, law and medicine among the foremost … There are many other vocations which, though more recently and therefore less firmly established, are nevertheless usually granted professional rank; all such vocations, architecture, engineering, chemistry, accountancy and surveying, for example, require mention." Over sixty years on, this remains a fair assessment of the situation.

We will now look at how the modern professions arose and how they differ from those in pre-industrial times, and then discuss some off the features that characterise modern professions.

Pre-industrial or Status Professionalism

In Europe during the middle ages, the Church controlled most types of knowledge and education. Men in holy orders made up the original "learned profession", which included specialists in canon (church) law. During the 12th century, free associations of scholars came together to form universities. By the beginning of the 13th century, the universities had largely taken the place of the monasteries as intellectual centres. With the Renaissance and the increasing secularisation of society, free cities (and later, independent states) came to have their own civil laws and law courts, often based on Roman law and independent of the canon law of the church. Although still very much under its influence, the universities were separate from the Church. Universities increasingly became responsible for training the rather small number of professionals who serviced the ruling elite. They taught theology, medicine and law, as well as proving practical education for potential statesman and public servants. A parallel system in the craft guilds trained practitioners to service the needs of the rest of the population.

By the 18th century, status was a matter of family title, position and inherited wealth, of who you were, rather than what you did. The professions provided occupation and a living for the younger sons of the nobility and gentry. The independence of the practitioner from employer and economic need, and even from work itself was idealised, but as long as professional services for kings and nobleman were provided by retainer living within their households, the possibility of autonomous, high-level professional practice did not arise (Elliot 1972).

Oxford and Cambridge universities made little contribution to the Industrial Revolution by the way of relevant professional education. Their stated object was rather to develop "capable and cultivated human beings" (Elliot 1972, p. 51). Rothblatt (1968) argued that the universities developed an ideology of public service and gentlemanly professionalism to justify their roles in developing, passing on and promoting the culture and ideology of the upper classes. Universities provided a "liberal education", which fitted one to be a gentleman, able to make a living without having to resort to manual labour or engaging in commerce or trade. Until the beginning of the nineteenth century in Britain, the gentlemanly learned professions were divinity (which effectively included university teaching), law and medicine. Architecture and the military also had high status.

The competitive examination system for university entry was introduced in Britain in the middle of the 19th century. It began the process of opening up the professions and the civil service to members of the rising middle class, who could aspire to increasing their status by taking up the profession. By this time, the civic universities in England, Scotland and Ireland had started to cater seriously for the demands of engineering.

Attitudes to education and the ideology of gentlemanly professionalism are of more than simply historical importance. A bias persists in Britain towards "liberal" tertiary education, directed towards general intellectual culture, rather than "narrowly" technical or professional. The Industrial revolution was accomplished without widespread adaptation of higher education to industrial values. In many ways manufacturing and engineering continue to be neglected; Glover and Kelly (1987, p. 440 argue that this neglect is the basic British economic problem, with Britain's poor record in industrial relations as one off its symptoms.

Occupational Professionalism

The nature of the professions changed with the rise of industrial society. The title "professional" was, and remains, a claim to social status, but the basis for claiming it changed from the upper class "who one was" to the middle class "what one did". Abercrombie and Urry (1983) provide an interesting review of the literature of class and professionalism and discuss its ideological content.

 The much greater division of labour introduced with the Industrial Revolution was accompanied by rapid growth of technical knowledge and of the education system, albeit belatedly in Britain. The pre-existing professions were reformed, and other occupational groups asserted their claims. Yet, despite revolutionary changes in the professions, many off the attitudes and ideals of professionalism today seem to have been carried over from the pre-industrial period. Probably the most important of these are the claims for high social status and of indifference to commercial considerations.

4. The Characteristics of Modern Professions

It is perhaps useful to ask: to what extent do various occupations exhibit to characteristics of professions; in what ways do occupations try to change as they try to become professionalised; what criteria for professions do they follow? Is there an ideal type for aspiring professions to model them on?

Johnson (1972, pp. 22-5) draws attention to the limitations of this very pragmatic "ideal type" approach to defining professions. The characteristics commonly cited are interdependent, and they do not have much in the way of theoretical underpinning or even coherence. Johnson argues that this lack off a coherent theoretical underpinning shows that they do not really define occupations at all, but that they: "… specify the characteristics of a peculiar form of occupational control." To put this another way, these characteristic actually relate to the power of professional groups and their claims to status and income, compared to the claims of other occupational groups in the society. Historically, the social status of both clientele and the recruits to a professional occupation have both been very relevant to its status. Today it is no longer clear-cut which groups are and which are not professions. In many ways, professionalism is more a matter of degree. In any case, professions are not static - the way they operate changes with economic, social, technical and political changes. Bearing in mind Johnson's qualifications as to their limited theoretical significance, it is still useful to look in detail at some of the "characteristics" on which claims to professionalism are currently based. Major characteristics of professions, and questions they raise, are as follows:

Substantial intellectual and practical training. This involves mastery o a body of generalised and systematic knowledge, achieved by a long period of study and certified by a degree or diploma from an accredited institution, usually a university.

The knowledge base needs to be broad enough that task cannot be a matter of routine, but distinct enough to be clearly defined and defended against adjoining specialist areas. Johnson (1972, p. 19) suggests that the theoretical body of knowledge also: "… includes a set of assumptions, an implicit or explicit theory, about the way the world is and the way society is organised." This is what Foucault (1970) might have described as the "Discourse of Engineering". It is important, since it shapes the world view and social attitudes of the practitioner. Aspects needing much greater attention ion the formation of engineers are the development of systems approaches, and of greater sensitivity to and insights into the broader context of engineering work.

Part of the professional formation of practitioners I that they largely come to accept their profession's view of the world, including its ethical attitudes, as their own. Implicit in the loose control over professionals, especially those in individual practice, is that it offers opportunities for exploitation. This makes the adoption of ethical attitudes important.

Provision of a specialised skill and service. The development of specialist areas gives rise to important issues of social control in three main areas: between the professional and the unskilled client; within the profession; and between the profession and the wider society. Many of these issues result from differences between the norms and values of the professional group and those of the wider society (Elliot 1972, pp. 11-12).

High degree of a professional autonomy and responsibility. This implies some degree of acceptance by society off the legitimacy of the claim for control by the professional group itself. The level of professional autonomy is related to the type of work and the work relationships. So is the extent to which professionals are able to impose their own definitions of the relationship between them and their clients. This is in turn related to the power of the professional group in the society and how it compares to the power of the consumers of the professional services (Johnson 1970, pp. 41-3).

The satisfaction inherent in addressing demanding technical problem clearly ha its own intrinsic rewards, which can engender commitment to the occupation. Early this century, professionalism was promoted as a counterbalancing force against what was seen as the narrow self-interest of business. It is interesting to speculate on whether this anticipated modern attitudes towards social responsibility, or whether it drew on pre-industrial "gentlemanly" attitudes based on status rather than occupational professionalism.

The increasing scale and complexity off all professional activity is reflected in a rising proportion of professionals who become salaried employees rather than independent practitioners. The question of compatibility between professional autonomy and employee status is particularly important for engineers, since most professional engineers are employees. (Similar trends are evident in medicine, where they are giving rise to considerable tensions.) There has been concern that employee status has not been compatible with the level of autonomy required for professional activity. This is only a special case off the problems of incorporating the professions within the social systems generally. It has been argued that, to be able to establish and implement their own goals in terms of technical competence, professional groups need to be sufficiently insulated from their constituents, that is from groups or interests in the society which might be in a position to shape them to their on needs (Elliot 1972, p. 104).

Key issues for salaried professionals are the potential for conflict or competition between professional and organisational goals and the means each has to press its claims. Professionals in large organisations, particularly public ones, may have been better insulated from direct commercial pressures than individual practitioners in marginally economic practices. Pressures towards corporatisation and privatisation have reduced this isolation. Professionals in larger groups may also be in a better position to focus their efforts on specific areas within the profession, rather than trying desperately to keep abreast off development across a wide disciplinary area.

As the scale off projects and the degree off specialisation needed for successful practice have increased over the last few decades, engineering consulting firms have evolved from partnerships to corporate structures. The management of professionals within these organisations raises important problems, particularly when the managers may not come from the same professional background. Such problems have become more common in engineering with the increasing use of multi-disciplinary project teams. These broad terms are needed to address the ecological and social impacts off projects as well as the technical aspects. The management problems have become more significant with the increasing "de-engineering" of senior levels of technical management.

An occupational organisation which controls the profession. Control of the profession's autonomy is confirmed when it is responsible, on behalf of the society, for testing the competence of practitioners, regulating standards and maintaining discipline. This responsibility can include control of working conditions, of entry to the profession, and even expulsion from it. The extent of control a profession is allowed to exercise over its own activities is at least partly a political question, decided through political process.

Control of professional activities by a professional organisation may extend to an effective and even a legally enforced monopoly on the type of service the profession offers. Such a monopoly is at variance with the ideology of the free market. One aim of a professional organisation is to establish a monopoly for its members in their area of practice. This increases their control over their work and, hopefully, their incomes. The justification typically offered is that this is necessary to maintain the attractiveness of the profession and thereby attract good new members. This argument is no longer accepted in respect of professional engineering work.

A fiduciary relationship with the client. Trust is essential to the relationship between professional and client. This is partly because clients are not generally expected to be able to assess for themselves the quality of the service provided. Much of the independence and authority of a professional is dealing with a client comes from the fact that the professional's primary reference group is made up of his or her professional colleagues.

 The client should play an important role in the design process. In collaboration with the professionals, the client needs to be able to develop a clear and comprehensive description off the problem. Without such a description, the client's needs are unlikely to be met well, if at all. Gardiner and Rothwell (1985, p 25) argue that the technologically demanding client can make a major contribution to innovations. In many cases, for example in research work, there may not be a specific client. There may also be conflicts between the interests off the client and those of the community. The code of ethics of the profession can be helpful here, in that it typically calls for primary responsibility towards the community as a whole.

5. References

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